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Abstract  
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to provide empirical insights on the impact of board 
and audit committee characteristics on the financial performance of United Arab Emirates 
(UAE) listed firms. 
Design/methodology/approach – A multiple regression panel model was employed for the 
period 2006 to 2015. The analysis incorporates Anderson Lagrange Multiplier test and 
Hausman test to determine if a fixed effects or random effects model should be employed. 
Findings – Our results demonstrated that board size and board meetings had a significant 
positive relationship with financial performance while there were also significant positive 
relationships between both audit committee composition and audit committee members’ 
education and firm financial performance. 
Research limitations/implications – The findings inform UAE firms about the benefits of 
employing directors with a more diverse skill set to enhance board effectiveness as well as 
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having audit committee members hold a recognised qualification in finance or accounting to 
improve firm financial performance. 
Originality/value – Our study contributes to the CG literature by adding to the limited studies 
on CG in the UAE which help reduce the significant gap between foundation theories and 
practical applicability. 
Keywords: Board characteristics, Audit characteristics, Firm performance, UAE 
1. Introduction 
In this paper, we investigate the association between board and audit committee 
characteristics and the financial performance of United Arab Emirates (UAE) firms. Our 
motivation for investigating the issue arises from the fact that despite the rapid growth and 
high levels of foreign investment experienced in the UAE which, from a per capita 
perspective, has the UAE among the top 30 economies in the world (Trading Economics, 
2017), the regulatory and legal framework in the UAE has, as yet, failed to keep up with 
these changes. Consequently, a disparity exists between the two. According to Andrew 
(2015), this has led to an absence of financial disclosure laws, which renders implementation 
of corporate governance (CG) policies ineffective.  
Such CG policies refer initially to the first voluntary CG code established by the UAE 
government via Decision No. R/32 of 2007. This presented the primary regulatory framework 
for the Emirates Securities and Commodities Authority (ESCA). In 2010, the second CG 
code became mandatory for all listed companies via Ministerial Resolution No. 518 of 2009, 
with these companies required to comply with the code by 30 April 2010. The shift to a more 
transparent and regulated financial environment via the implementation of CG codes with is 
focus on roles and responsibilities of board directors, auditors and other stakeholders (ESCA, 
2016) has had direct effects on board and audit committee characteristics (Steven and Carla 
2010).  
While studies in developed countries on the effect of CG on corporate financial performance 
report evidence that some corporate governance mechanisms have a crucial impact, that there 
is still a paucity of studies in the UAE (and developing countries in general), particularly in 
the area of audit committee characteristics. Subsequently, the relationship between CG and 
financial performance is not as well understood in developing countries as it is in the 
developed world (Elghuweel, 2015). Generalisation of the findings of the few studies that 
have examined CG in specific Middle Eastern countries are invalid, as posited by 
Ananchotikul (2007), because of the variations in the regulatory regimes. This limited 
understanding of the CG mechanisms and their impact on corporate performance among 
Middle Eastern countries enhances the importance of a UAE specific study examining the 
effect of CG characteristics on firm financial performance. 
Consequently, the main objective of this study is to identify the relationship between board 
and audit committee characteristics on the financial performance of UAE listed firms. The 
study employs data on 47 listed companies on the Dubai Financial Market (DFM) and Abu 
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Dhabi Securities Exchange (ADX), covering the period 2006 to 2015. The data were 
analysed via a multiple regression panel model. 
Our empirical results show that board size and board meetings had a significant positive 
relationship with financial performance (as measured by return on assets [ROA] and return 
on equity [ROE]).Significant positive relationships was found to exist between financial 
performance and audit committee composition, audit committee members’ education and the 
number of audit committee meetings.  
Our study contributes to the CG literature by adding to the limited studies on CG in the UAE 
which help reduce the significant gap between foundation theories and practical applicability. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews prior empirical 
literature and develops the hypothesis. Section 3 describes the research design. Section 4 
presents results and discusses findings. Section 5 draws conclusions, presents the 
implications and discusses recommendations for further research. 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
2.1 Multi-Theoretic Approach 
This study framework combines agency theory and resource dependence theory to develop 
and understanding of the complex nature of CG. For instance, agency theory states that 
independent directors provide important monitoring functions in an attempt to resolve the 
conflict between agents and principals—an aspect ignored by stewardship theory. Agency 
theory also provides the basis for the governance standards, codes and principles developed 
by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (OECD, 2004, 
2015). More importantly, the 2009 UAE CG code, which constitutes a cornerstone of the 
UAE CG reforms, aims to reduce conflicts between managers and shareholders by improving 
the transparency, accountability and responsibility of corporate boards of directors.  
In addition, the economy of the Gulf States has been reliant on international workforce for a 
prolonged period. This characteristic is best reflected by resource dependence theory because 
it provides a comprehensive exposition of the relationship between a firm and its external 
environment and resources (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003).  
2.2 Board and Audit Committee Characteristics 
According to Boone et al. (2007), the board holds a very significant place in the design of a 
corporate organisation and stands accountable to stakeholders. Active and successful boards 
of directors monitor management to reduce managerial activities unaligned with shareholder 
interests. On the role of audit committees, Almatari, Alswidi and Fadzil (2014a) state that 
audit committee members have a potential to make a significant contribution to minimising 
financial fraud and improving financial performance by ensuring that CG practices are 
followed in the auditing process. Given this established positive effect of board and audit 
characteristics on firm financial performance, the following sub-sections provides a succinct 
review of empirical studies, with a greater emphasis on developing country studies, that focus 
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on the impact of board and audit characteristics on a firm’s financial performance as 
measured by ROA and ROE. 
2.3 Board Size  
In theory, firms should benefit from having larger boards for monitoring, strategy formulation 
and access to resources leading to improved financial performance. Empirical studies by 
Almatari et al. (2014b) and Johl et al. (2015) demonstrated a significant positive relationship 
between board size and firm financial performance in Oman and Malaysia respectively. Other 
studies such as Rouf (2011) in Banagladesh and Ghabayen (2012) in the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia (KSA) did not identify any significant relationship. Kajola (2008) found a significant 
positive relationship. Based on the overall findings, the following hypothesis is developed: 
H1: There is a positive relationship between board size and firm financial performance in the 
UAE. 
2.4 Board Independent Directors  
As Dalton et al. (1998) found, firms with a majority of independent directors on the board 
enhances its effectiveness and provides superior performance. According to studies by Yasser 
et al. (2011) and later by Khan and Awan (2012) on Pakistan data and Kyereboah-Coleman 
and Biekpe (2006) in Ghana, there was a significant positive relationship between 
independent directors and firm financial performance as measured by a combination of ROA 
and ROE. Conversely, Ghabayen’s (2012) study in KSA identified a significant negative 
relationship while studies on Nigeria from both Dabor et al. (2015) and Kajola (2008) did not 
identify any significant relationships. Based on the overall findings, the following hypothesis 
is developed: 
H2: There is a positive relationship between board independent directors and firm financial 
performance in the UAE. 
2.5 Board Meetings 
Several studies have confirmed that board meetings-as measured by the number of meetings 
per annum-play an important role in the governance, regulatory compliance and performance 
of companies (Jensen, 1993; Lipton and Lorsch, 1992). With respect to the empirical findings, 
there were some mixed results arising from examining the relationship between board 
meetings and firm financial performance. For example, Ntim and Oseit’s (2011) South 
African study showed a significant positive relationship as too did Hsu and Petchsakulwong’s 
(2010) Thailand study. However, Johl et al.’s (2015) Malaysian study exhibited a significant 
negative relationship. This led to the following hypothesis: 
H3: There is a positive relationship between board meetings and firm financial performance 
in the UAE. 
2.6 Board Members’ Education 
According to Almatari et al. (2013), having a qualified and educated member on the board 
improves firm financial performance. A number of studies have identified a significant 
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positive relationship between board members’ education and firm financial performance 
(Almatari et al., 2013; Gottesman and Morey, 2006; Vo and Phan, 2013; Hsu, 2010). 
Consequently, the hypothesis for this study is: 
H4: There is a positive relationship between board members’ education and firm financial 
performance in the UAE. 
2.7 Board Members’ Experience 
According to Pfeffer and Salancik (2003), board members with greater experience bring with 
them skills, knowledge and expertise which can positively affect firms’ financial performance. 
This is supported by the findings of Vo and Phan (2013) in Vietnam, Hsu (2010) Zhu and 
Shen (2016) in USA, Johl et al. (2015) in Malaysia, and Mura (2007) in the UK, where all 
exhibited strong significant positive relationships between board members’ experience and 
firm financial performance. Based on the overall findings, the following hypothesis is 
developed: 
H5: There is a positive relationship between board members’ experience and firm financial 
performance in the UAE. 
2.8 Audit Committee Size  
In theory, firms with a larger audit committee size should benefit financially compared to 
firms with a smaller audit committee size (Khalifa, 2018). Empirical studies by Hamdan et al. 
(2013), Aldamen et al. (2012), Kyereboah-Coleman (2008) and Ibrahim et al. (2009) 
established a significant positive relationship between audit committee size and firm financial 
performance. Conversely, studies from Almatari et al. (2012) and Vafeas (1999) have showed 
a significant negative relationship. Furthermore, studies by Ghabayen (2012) as well as Mak 
and Kusnadi (2005) did not identify any significant relationship. Based on the overall 
findings, the following hypothesis is developed: 
H6: There is a positive relationship between audit committee size and firm financial 
performance in the UAE. 
2.9 Audit Committee Independent Members 
According to Khalifa (2018), independent members of the audit committee play an important 
role in improving the monitoring of management which can lead to improved firm financial 
performance. Empirical studies by Yasser et al. (2011) and Almatari et al. (2014b) in 
Pakistan and Oman respectively showed that there was a significant positive relationship 
between independent members of the audit committee and firm financial performance. 
However, empirical studies from Ghabayen (2012) and Kajola (2008) in KSA and Nigeria 
respectively identified no significant relationship. Based on the overall findings, the 
following hypothesis is developed: 
H7: There is a positive relationship between audit committee independent members and firm 
financial performance in the UAE. 
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2.10 Audit Committee Meetings 
Active audit committee meetings play an important role in the governance, compliance and 
financial performance of companies. One could argue that firm financial performance should 
improve as the number of meetings increase. The empirical evidence however is mixed. For 
instance, a study by Almatari et al. (2014b) in Oman identified a significant positive 
relationship between audit committee meetings and firm financial performance whereas 
Aldamen et al.’s (2012) Australian study showed a significant negative relationship. Other 
studies by Hamdan et al. (2013) and Alqatamin (2018) in Amman and Jordan respectively did 
not identify any significant relationship. Based on the overall findings, the following 
hypothesis is developed: 
H8: There is a positive relationship between audit committee meetings and firm financial 
performance in the UAE. 
2.11 Audit Committee Members’ Education 
According to Aldamen et al. (2012), audit committee members with a background in finance 
or accounting contribute positively to firm financial performance. Majority of the studies on 
the influence of audit committee educational background on firm financial performance, have 
identified a positive relationship (Aldamen et al., 2012; Almatari et al., 2014a; Hamid and 
Aziz, 2012). There was however a significant negative association found in Badolato et al.’s 
(2014) UK study. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
H9: There is a positive relationship between audit committee members’ education and firm 
financial performance in the UAE. 
2.12 Firm Financial Performance  
As Khatab et al. (2011) posits, the extant literature on CG and firm financial performance 
regarding accounting-based measures of financial performance are vast. Of these, Almatari et 
al. (2014c) found that ROA is the most used accounting-based measure (46%), followed by 
ROE (27%). The present research will employ the two most common accounting-based 
measures: ROA and ROE (Aldamen et al., 2012; Johl, Kaur and Cooper, 2015; Vo and Phan, 
2013; Yasser, Entebang and Mansor, 2011) in order to obtain a more robust representation of 
firm financial performance. In addition, the study will employ three control variables widely 
used in CG studies: firm age, leverage, and firm size. 
3. Conceptual Framework and Research Method 
3.1 Conceptual Framework 
Incorporating findings reported in the literature, and the study research questions, a 
conceptual framework was developed to encompass the associations between CG 
characteristics and the firm value of UAE listed firms. The framework serves as the 
foundation for this study and is presented in Figure 1 below. 
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Figure 1. Conceptual framework for the study 
3.2 Data 
This study used secondary data obtained from different online sources: DFM, ADX, Mint 
Global, Orbis-Bureau van Dijk, DataStream, UAE listed firms’ website and ESCA (see 
Appendix 1 for variable measurement and source). Data related to firm financial performance 
were obtained from financial statements, such as balance sheets, income statements and cash 
flow statements provided in annual reports. 
The sample initially consisted of all UAE firms listed on the DFM and ADX as of July 2016. 
The selection of companies was determined by the availability of 10 years of data. In total, 
there were 127 listed companies at that time, with 59 listed companies on the DFM and 68 
listed companies on the ADX for the 10 years from 2006 to 2015. The DFM and ADX 
markets were chosen because companies on these markets are more likely to attract and 
employ skilled and competent individuals on the board of directors and audit committees. A 
purposive sampling technique was used to select companies. The listed companies selected in 
this study had to meet three criteria: (i) provide information about board and audit committee 
characteristics for the study period; (ii) provide financial performance information; and (iii) 
possess complete data for the study period. Based on these criteria, the number of firms was 
reduced to 61. Another 14 companies were omitted from the study sample because they 
contained outliers, which is a standard practice (Hair et al., 2010). As a result, the present 
study’s final sample comprised 47 listed firms and 470 total observations. 
3.3 Estimation 
As demonstrated by Baddeley and Barrowclough (2009), ordinary last squares (OLS) is not 
ideal in the presence of fixed effects (FE), such as firm-specific effects, are time invariant, yet 
unobservable. If the FE are ignored, especially in a time series data set, heterogeneity bias is 
generated. The bias occurs because the time-invariant FE that may affect individual 
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cross-sectional units are not included in the deterministic part of the model. Heterogeneity 
bias is a form of omitted variable bias that would produce auto-correlated errors. The sample 
in this study includes data both across firms and over time; thus, panel data regression is the 
appropriate tool to be applied since it can eliminate heterogeneity bias using either a FE 
model or a random effects (RE) model (Baddeley and Barrowclough, 2009). 
Hence, this study employs panel regression analysis to examine the relationships between the 
variables selected in the study. Two panel models will be examined—FE and RE—with a 
Hausman test performed on each. Regression panel data have been employed in previous 
studies such as those by Kajola (2008) and O’Connell and Cramer (2010), who used them to 
test the relationship between CG and firm financial performance. 
As stated previously, this paper aims to identify the relationship between board and audit 
committee characteristics and the financial performance of UAE listed firms. To accomplish 
this, a multiple regression panel analysis is used to test the aforementioned nine study 
hypotheses. Two equations are estimated, one for each of the financial performance variables 
(ROA and ROE). The estimated regression is in the form: 
FPit = α + β1,tBSit + β2,tBINDit + β3,tBMit + β4,tBMEDit + β5,tBMEXit + β6,tACSit 
+ β7,tACINDit + β8,tACMit + β9,tACEDit + β10,tFAit + β11,t LEVit + β12,tFSit + eit  (1) 
where: 
BS = board size 
BIND = board independent directors 
BM = board meetings 
BMED = board members’ education 
BMEX = board members’ experience 
ACS = audit committee size 
ACIND = audit committee independent members 
ACM = audit committee meetings 
ACED = audit committee members’ education 
FA = firm age 
LEV = leverage 
FS = firm size 
FPit = financial performance, ROA or ROE, under company i over time t. 
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4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 below provides the descriptive statistics for the variables related to board and audit 
characteristics. The mean size of boards in the sample was 7.70, ranging from five to 15 
members of which on average, 71.24%, were independent directors. The statistics are in line 
with the recommendations of the first and second UAE CG codes. The Board met at least 
once a year with a maximum of 16 meetings per year, and an average of about 6 meetings per 
year. On average, 74% of the members had a degree from an overseas university, ranging 
from 36% to 100%. On average, board members had 21 years’ experience, which ranged 7 to 
39 years.  
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of board and audit committee characteristics 
Variable N Abbr. Minimum Maximum Mean 
Board size 470 BS 5 15 7.70 
Board independent directors 470 BIND 33% 100% 71.24% 
Board meetings 470 BM 1 16 6.15 
Board members’ education 470 BMED 36% 100% 74.36% 
Board members’ experience 470 BMEX 7 39 21.19 
Audit committee size 470 ACS 2 7 3.32 
Audit committee independent 
members 
470 ACIND 20% 100% 81.13% 
Audit committee meetings 470 ACM 2 12 4.70 
Audit committee members’ 
education 
470 ACED 0 100% 41.80% 
The mean audit committee size in the sample comprised 3.32 committee members, ranging 
from a minimum of two members to a maximum of seven members. The audit committee 
size was not stated in the first CG code in the UAE, while the second code stated that the 
audit committee should have at least three members. In addition, on average, 81.13% of audit 
committee members were independent, with a minimum of 20% and a maximum of 100%. 
Further, the mean number of audit committee meetings was 4.70, ranging from a minimum of 
two meetings to a maximum of 12 meetings per year. The audit committee members’ 
education ranged from a minimum of 0% to a maximum of 100% of audit committee 
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members holding a degree in a financial discipline. On average, 41.80% of members held a 
financial degree. 
4.2 Correlation Matrix and Collinearity 
Table 2 shows the results of the variance inflation factor (VIF) and tolerance for the 
independent and control variables in the model. A tolerance (1/VIF) value of less than 0.20 
and a VIF value of greater than 10 indicates the presence of collinearity. In addition, table 3 
presents the correlation values of the variables for this study period. Overall, the correlations 
are far below the criteria of 0.8 suggested by Grewal, Cote and Baumgartner (2004) and 
Shearer and Clark (2016). Specifically, the results show negligible and low correlation among 
all variables. Given the low figures for collinearity, the VIF and tolerance results are within 
the acceptable range, which indicates the absence of multicollinearity. 
Table 2. Results for VIF and tolerance 
Variable VIF Tolerance (1/VIF) 
Board size (BS) 1.61 0.620 
Board independent directors (BIND) 1.52 0.655 
Board meetings (BM) 1.30 0.769 
Board members’ education (BMED) 1.13 0.885 
Board members’ experience (BMEX) 1.28 0.783 
Audit committee size (ACS) 1.42 0.703 
Audit committee independent members (ACIND) 1.17 0.852 
Audit committee meeting (ACM) 1.53 0.652 
Audit committee members’ education (ACED) 1.14 0.876 
Firm age (FA) 1.42 0.704 
Leverage (LEV) 1.07 0.932 
Firm size (FS) 1.37 0.730 
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Table 3. Correlation matrix 
 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed). 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed). 
4.3 Overview of Results of Return on Assets 
Since this study uses panel data, some econometric issues need to be addressed. The 
Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test is employed to guide model selection. The result of the LM 
test is significant (p-value < 0.001), thereby suggesting that panel regression is more suitable 
than OLS. In addition, since panel data models can be specified as either FE or RE, a 
Hausman test is employed. The Hausman test result is statistically insignificant (
2
 = 11.38, 
p-value = 0.497); consequently, a RE model is appropriate to use for ROA. The results of the 
two tests (Hausman and LM) are presented in Appendix 2. The results of the ROA model 
estimation are shown in Table 4. 
Table 4. Random-effect panel data regression model for ROA 
 Variable RE Model 




Board size (BS) 0.082
** 
0.315 0.015 
Board independent directors (BIND) -0.002
* 
0.002 0.080 
Board meetings (BM) 0.090
* 
0.030 0.017 
Board members’ education (BMED) 0.002 0.004 0.527 
Board members’ experience (BMEX) -0.017 0.009 0.151 
Audit committee size (ACS) -0.035 0.101 0.736 




0.002 < 0.001 
International Journal of Accounting and Financial Reporting 
ISSN 2162-3082 
2020, Vol. 10, No. 2 
http://ijafr.macrothink.org 71 
Audit committee meetings (ACM) 0.107
**
 0.037 0.006 




0.002 < 0.001 
Control 
variables 
Leverage (LEV) -0.001 0.001 0.664 
Firm age (FA) 0.007 0.007 0.239 
Firm size (FS) -0.129 0.129 0.168 
 Constant 0.941 0.693 0.142 
Model fit: Wald (chi-square) = 248.11, p-value < 0.001 
R-squared = 0.430 
Note: *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
The proposed RE model for ROA, is statistically significant (
2
 = 248.11, p-value < 0.001) 
and able to fit the linear relationship between ROA and the selected independent variables, 
with a R
2
 of 43.0%. As shown in table 4 board size, board meetings, audit committee 
independent members, audit committee meetings and audit committee members’ education 
have significant positive relationships with ROA, while the only variable with a negative 
relationship is board independent directors. The other variables, members’ education, board 
members’ experience, and audit committee size did not produce a significant relationship to 
ROA. 
4.4 Overview of Results of Return on Equity 
For the ROE model, the LM test suggested the panel regression methods (
2
 = 36.58, p-value 
< 0.001). The Hausman test indicated that the RE is the appropriate approach for the ROE 
model (
2
 = 10.65, p-value = 0.559). The results of the Hausman tests are given in Appendix 
2. The results of the ROE model estimation are given in Table 5. 
Table 5. Random-Effect panel data regression model for ROE 
 Variable RE Model  




Board size (BS) 0.141
**
 0.052 0.007 
Board independent directors (BIND) ˗0.014
**
 0.005 0.010 
Board meetings (BM) 0.211
***
 0.056 < 0.001 
Board members’ education (BMED) 0.004 0.005 0.432 
Board members’ experience (BMEX) ˗0.004 0.019 0.776 
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Audit committee size (ACS) ˗0.380
**
 0.158 0.016 
Audit committee independent members 
(ACIND) 
0.002 0.004 0.532 
Audit committee meetings (ACM) 0.366
***
 0.058 < 0.001 




 0.003 < 0.001 
Control 
variables 
Leverage (LEV) 0.002 0.003 0.451 
Firm age (FA) 0.009 0.009 0.347 
Firm size (FS) ˗0.105 0.151 0.489 
 Constant 0.655 0.979 0.503 
Model fit: Wald (chi-square) = 180.32, p-value < 0.001 
R-squared = 0.352 
Note: *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
As shown in the table the estimated equation is statistically significant (p-value < 0.001). The 
R
2
 indicates that the predictors explain 35.2% of variation in ROE. The results demonstrate 
that board size and board meetings have significant positive relationships with ROE. In 
addition, audit committee meetings and audit committee members’ education have significant 
positive relationships with ROE. Meanwhile, significant negative relationships are identified 
between ROE and board composition and audit committee size. The other variables, board 
members’ education and audit committee composition did not produce a significant 
relationship to ROE. The results of the ROA and ROE model are discussed in the next 
sub-section. 
4.5 Discussion of Results 
From an overall perspective, five board characteristics had the same effect on ROA and ROE. 
With respect to the four audit committee characteristics, two variables (audit committee 
meetings and audit committee members’ education) were significant, while, for the other two 
variables, audit committee size was significant for ROE, while audit committee independent 
members was significant for ROA. The two differences in significance between ROA and 
ROE for audit committee characteristics is unsurprising because, as indicated by Rappaport 
(1986); Finegan (1991); and Koller Goedhart and Wessels (1996), the two financial 
performance measures have different focuses. 
The findings as given in Table 6 indicate that large board sizes do contribute to firm financial 
performance. This can be explained by the communication and coordination among firm 
directors on the board in the UAE, which increase their ability to monitor and evaluate 
executive managers. In addition, the findings of ROA and ROE support the argument that 
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companies may include independent directors on the board for legitimacy purposes, rather 
than for improvement of firm financial performance (DiMaggio and Powell, 2004). In other 
words, a possible reason for the negative effect on ROA and ROE for UAE listed firms could 
be because the increase in proportion of independent board members occurred to strictly 
comply with the law. Another possible reason could be the insufficient knowledge held by 
independent directors, which did not translate to increased firm financial performance. 
Furthermore, the role of independent directors in UAE listed firms is still open to debate 
because of a lack of clarification regarding the specific role of independent directors 
(Altamimi and Charif, 2012). 
Table 6. Summary result of regression model for ROA & ROE 
Variable Result 
ROA ROE 
Board size (BS) Pos, Sig
 
Pos, Sig 
Board independent directors (BIND) Neg, Sig
 
Neg, Sig 
Board meetings (BM) Pos, Sig
 
Pos, Sig 
Board members’ education (BMED) Pos, Insig Pos, Insig 
Board members’ experience (BMEX) Neg, Insig Neg, Insig 
Audit committee size (ACS) Neg, Insig Neg, Sig 
Audit committee independent members (ACIND) Pos, Sig
 
Pos, Insig 
Audit committee meetings (ACM) Pos, Sig Pos, Sig 
Audit committee members’ education (ACED) Pos, Sig
 
Pos, Sig 
The results indicated that board meetings had a significant and positive effect on ROA and 
ROE, which suggests that more board meetings led to higher financial performance of the 
UAE listed companies. This finding is supported by previous studies by Ntim and Oseit 
(2011) and Tarak, Nath and Apu (2013). 
From an accounting-based perspective, it seems that board members holding educational 
qualifications from developed-country universities is a positive but not significant factor for 
the financial performance of UAE listed firms. This view is supported by Darmadi (2013) in 
Indonesia, and by Vo and Phan (2013) study in Vietnam. 
With respect to the non-significant outcome for board members’ experience, a possible 
reason for this result is that the UAE CG codes did not state the level of experience that the 
members should hold. Although very little empirical research has been undertaken in this 
area, this view is supported by Johl (2006). Thus, boards need to ensure they have a suitable 
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mix of members with appropriate skills and experience to cope with business complexities, 
competition and change. 
In terms of audit committee size, relationship was significant and negative for ROE and 
non-significant for ROA. One possible reason for the significant result for ROE could be the 
lack of a specific description and specification of the number of audit committee members in 
the UAE CG code, which only recommended having at least three members on the committee. 
Thus, it could be due to a lack of communication and coordination among firm audit 
committee members in the UAE.  
The present research found that audit committee independent members had a significant and 
positive effect on the ROA and an insignificant and positive relationship with ROE. One 
possible reason for the non-significant effect of audit committee composition on ROE is that 
the ROE indicator measured the effectiveness of UAE firms taking advantage of their equity 
base. That is, it indicated how effectively a company used its shareholders’ money (Almatari, 
Alswidi and Fadzil, 2014c). Thus, it would seem that audit committee members of UAE 
listed firms are less effective in taking advantage of their earnings advantage from their 
equity base, as opposed to taking earnings advantage of their base of assets. 
A significant and positive relationship between audit committee meetings and ROA and ROE 
was identified. The finding is supported by prior studies, such as those by Hsu (2010) and 
Almatari, Alswidi and Fadzil (2014b).  
The present research found that audit committee members’ education had a significant and 
positive effect on both ROA and ROE. This result is supported by previous studies such as 
Yang and Krishnan (2005), Aldamen et al. (2012) and Almatari, Alswidi and Fadzil (2014a). 
The result supports changes to the CG code, which stated, in regard to members’ education, 
that the audit committee should have at least one member with a financial qualification or an 
expert in accounting and financial affairs. 
5. Conclusion 
This study investigated the association between board and audit committee characteristics 
and the financial performance of UAE listed firms as measured by ROA and ROE. Panel 
regression models were used to test the study’s nine hypotheses based on a study sample of 
47 listed UAE companies on the DFM and ADX covering a period of 10 years from 2006 to 
2015. Our results suggest that board size, board meetings, audit committee meetings and 
audit committee members’ experience all had a significant and positive impact on firm 
financial performance as measured by ROA and ROE. In addition, audit committee 
independent members had a positive and significant impact as measured by ROA. Conversely, 
board independent directors had a significant and negative impact of firm financial 
performance as measured by ROA and ROE while audit committee size was found to have a 
significant and negative impact as measured by ROE only. The remaining two variables, 
board members’ education and board members’ experience were found to be insignificant. 
Overall our results demonstrate that board and audit characteristics do have an important 
influence on impact of firm financial performance.  
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Some implications arising from the results suggest that there is a lack of an appropriate skill 
base among members of the board of directors. Thus, UAE firms should consider appointing 
directors with a more diverse skill set to enhance board effectiveness. The analysis suggests 
the need to rationalise the size of audit committees, which were found to exert a significant 
and negative influence on firm financial performance. The UAE CG code does not mention a 
specific number of members to constitute an effective audit committee size, and does not 
contain any specific guideline about the number of audit committee members. This is an issue 
that could be investigated and supported with more specific recommendations. The overall 
findings suggest that too many independent directors negatively impact financial performance. 
Currently, the UAE codes endorse a regulation requiring that listed firms appoint a minimum 
one-third of board directors as independent directors. Hence, the UAE should specify the 
maximum proportion of independent members on the board to ensure that firms do not have 
100% of independent directors on the board, given that a well-diversified board can improve 
firm financial performance. Future policy should focus more on the relationship between 
audit committee members’ education and firm financial performance. Specifically, that UAE 
listed firms should consider introducing a requirement whereby all audit committee members 
must have a recognised qualification in finance or significant expertise in accounting and 
financial affairs. 
There are limitations inherent in this study that may affect the generalisability of our results. 
First, was the exclusion of non-listed companies in the UAE from the sample due to the UAE 
government decision to introduce the CG codes only for listed companies in the ADX and 
DFM. Second, the amount of available data to assess UAE CG practice for listed companies 
restricted the sample size to approximately 37% of the population. Third, the focus on 
secondary data meant that other potential factors that influence firm financial performance 
were omitted such as the views from a wide range of stakeholders—such as regulators, 
investors, foreign corporate partners or consumers. Fourth, this research used ROA and ROE 
to measure firm financial performance because these are traditional and common 
measurements however other measures of firm financial performance, such as Tobin’s Q, 
profit margin, earnings per share and return on sales could also have been used. Consequently, 
the results should be interpreted with caution.  
Future research could be carried out on a comparative study of UAE with other Middle 
Eastern countries and/or developing countries. Further studies could expand the notion of CG 
beyond board and audit committee characteristics by exploring effects of various other 
committees, such as remuneration and nomination committees. Another avenue could be an 
investigation of the difference between listed and non-listed companies in terms of CG 
practices in the UAE. 
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Appendix 
Appendix 1. Study variables and their measures 
 
Appendix 2. Hausman and Lagrange multiplier tests for ROA and ROE models 
Hausman test [ROA] 
Chi-square p-value 
11.38 0.4970 
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for RE results 
Chi-square p-value 
12.89 < 0.001 
Hausman test [ROE] 
Chi-square p-value 
10.65 0.5594 
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for RE results 
Chi-square p-value 
36.58 < 0.001 
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